ABSTRACT Caching popular contents is a promising way to offload the mobile data traffic in wireless networks, but so far the potential advantage of caching in improving physical layer security (PLS) is rarely considered. In this paper, we contribute to the design and theoretical understanding of exploiting the caching ability to improve the transmission security in a wireless heterogeneous network. Two transmission schemes, namely Symbol-level scheme and Bit-level scheme, are considered in such network to improve PLS by utilizing the content property of cached files. In Symbol-level scheme, the base station (BS) ensures the secrecy of communication by transmitting the requested file along with a pre-cached file of the user such that the eavesdropper's channel is degraded. In Bit-level scheme, the BS encodes the requested file with a pre-cached file to fully resist the overhearing of eavesdroppers in bit level, e.g., network coding. Accordingly, the node locations of BSs, users and eavesdroppers are first modeled as mutually independent Poisson point processes and the corresponding file access protocol is developed. We consider two scenarios where each scheme is employed respectively, and then derive analytical expressions of two secrecy metrics in terms of average secrecy rate and secrecy coverage probability. Numerical results are provided to show the significant security advantages of the proposed schemes and to characterize the impacts of the cache ability and network resources on the security performance.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing popularity of mobile payment and internet of things has enabled the privacy and security of data transmission to be an important issue in wireless cellular networks. However, the transferred information may be eavesdropped and jammed due to the broadcast nature of wireless channel [2] . To address this challenge, physical layer security (PLS) has emerged as a promising technology to improve the security of wireless data transmission.
The fundamental principle of PLS is to exploit the inherent randomness of wireless channels to reduce the information extracted by eavesdroppers (Eves) [3] . In the work [4] , Wyner showed that the secrecy of transmission can be perfectly guaranteed at a positive secrecy rate if the legitimating channel is better than the eavesdropping channel. Further, various efficient approaches were studied to improve the maximal secrecy rate by using multiinput single-output techniques [5] , or deploying cooperative relays [6] .
To meet the explosive mobile data traffic, one of the most efficient way is heterogeneous and dense deployment of base stations (BSs) to improve network thoughput [7] . However, such heterogeneous networks (HetNets) entail wireless transmissions suffer more severe interference than before. Moreover, due to the random distributed locations of Eves, the security of data transmissions in HetNets is facing more challenges. The works [8] - [12] utilized Poisson point process (PPP) to model the node locations of HetNets, and proposed efficient schemes to improve the security of data transmissions. Specifically, the work [9] characterized the influence of randomly located Eves to the average secrecy rate of network. Wang et al. [10] considered an artificialnoise-aided secure transmission scheme, and analyzed the secrecy probability of the user. The work [11] developed an analytical expression of the average secrecy rate to evaluate the performance of PLS in a 3-tier HetNets. Tang et al. [12] considered that jammers and users can send jamming signals to confound Eves. By optimizing the selection of jammer, the user connection probability is maximized under the secrecy rate constraint.
Recently, caching popular contents at BSs and users at offpeak time has been a promising technique to offload mobile data traffic in wireless networks [13] and to reduce network delay [14] - [18] . Caching can also be utilized to improve the received signal strength at users [19] , [20] where pre-cached files are used as side information to cancel part of received interferences. By properly encoding the pre-cached and the delivered files, the work [21] realized secure coded multicast delivery under different cache placements.
Furthermore, since caching enables content can be multiaccessed from wireless edge, the potential of caching to improve PLS has been studied in recent works [22] - [27] . In work [22] and [23] , the authors considered cache-enabled wireless networks where multiple cache-enabled nodes can perform cooperative transmission based on their cached files. The network in [22] and [23] is a fixed topology consisting of one Eve, multiple BSs and users. Zheng et al. [24] studied a typical user served by multiple location fixed cache-enabled BSs and overheard by PPP distributed Eves. Based on different cache placement strategy, they studied two coordinated multi-point transmission techniques. However, such works do not consider how to do better in the transmission security by using the content property of cached files.
To end this goal, we try to design two transmission schemes to facilitate PLS by properly using the file of users local storages, namely Symbol-level Scheme and Bit-level Scheme, in this paper. In the symbol-level scheme, BS ensures the secrecy of communication by allocating part of transmitting power to send a pre-cached file simultaneously. As such, the SINR of eavesdropping can be restricted within an upper bound by the cost of transmission power. With the help of caching, BS can simply introduce interference to Eves and the users can easily cancel the interference by using the corresponding stored file. In the symbol-level scheme, by encoding the target file with pre-cached file, e.g., network coding, the Eves can obtain nothing from the received combined signal without any cost of transmission power. This promising potential prompts us to make a fully research of these schemes and compares them in secrecy metrics under different scenarios in this paper.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• A cache-enabled three-tier wireless HetNet is considered, where the positions of BSs, users and Eves are modeled as mutually independent homogeneous PPPs. Based on the cache-enabled user and cache-untenabled Eves, we propose two novel cache-aided transmission schemes to improve PLS of such network, namely Symbol-level Scheme and Bit-level Scheme.
• For the symbol-level scheme, the requested file of a cache-enabled user is transmitted along with user's cached file by the BS based on superposition coding. This part of pre-cached file can be well cancelled by the user while Eves are greatly confounded.
• For the bit-level scheme, BS serves the request of a cache-enabled user by encoding the requested file with a pre-cached file by using network coding. Without sacrificing transmission power of user, the eavesdropping are fully resisted.
• To characterize the performance of the proposed schemes, we derive analytical expressions of average secrecy rate and secrecy coverage probability. Using tools of stochastic geometry, we reveal the relationship between the cache ability and PLS. Numerical results show that the proposed cache-aided schemes can achieve a significant gain over the normal transmission.
II. SYSTEM MODEL A. NETWORK STRUCTURE
As shown in Fig. 1 We assume only α part of users have cache ability, where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. The cache-enabled users also follow a thinning PPP with density αλ u . The cache-enabled users have the same caching size with (M ×L) bits, where we consider M < N and it can store the same M -most popular files out of F, termed as a set M {f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f M }. To the aim of tractability, we assume that BSs can access all the files in F by directly connect to the core-network and neglect the extra cost for BS to fetch files. 1 The set M can be broadcasted to all users by BSs at off-peak time then pre-stored at cache-enabled users. ERs considered in this paper have no cache ability.
B. FILE ACCESS PROTOCOL
Let Q be the total amount of request from users in u at one slot. As indicated in Fig. 1 , the file access protocol can be described as follows: (a) Self-offloading: When a cache-enabled user requests a file in M, the request will be satisfied and offloaded immediately from the user's local storage, termed as ''Self-offloading". By denoting the cache hit probability of the request fall in The transmission signal is t i = √ Px i . Moreover, according to which subset of f i belongs to, the request can be divided into two types: f i ∈ M and f i ∈ C. Therefore the amount of these two types request are
In this paper, we assume all the BSs work in the full loaded state due to λ u λ b and each BS randomly serves one of user requests with equal probability. Therefore, the locations of BS in different states {(b), (c)} are distributed as thinning PPPs
III. ANALYSIS OF TRANSMISSION PROTOCOL
In this section, we analyze the characteristics of different transmission protocols under two schemes. According to Slivnyak's theorem [28] , a typical user u 0 locating at the origin of the Euclidean area does not change the distribution of PPP, no matter with or without caching ability. We also consider that the link between u 0 and its serving BS b 0 can be eavesdropped by all ERs in the network.
A. SYMBOL-LEVEL SCHEME 1) NORMAL TRANSMISSION
A typical user with no cache ability denoted as un 1 requests f i from F. The nearest BS b 0 serves this request within the normal-transmission. Since the interference signals transmitted by other BSs from b 1 , b 2 , b 3 cannot be cancelled without cached files, the interference un 1 suffering is equivalent coming from { b \b 0 } with power P. Therefore the received signal of un 1 is 
is the transmission signal of b 0 (b k ), and n 0 ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ) denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN). W.l.o.g, the variance of AWGN noise n i is σ 2 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4 in this paper.
Therefore the received SINR at un 1 is
For the ER of un 1 , the received signal at an arbitrary ER e j ∈ e is similarly given by:
Because x i is eavesdropped signal for e j , the SINR of e j can be written as
2) SECURE TRANSMISSION
A typical user with cache ability denoted as uc 1 requests f i from C. The nearest BS b 0 will serve this request within the secure-transmission. The received signal at uc 1 is given by:
As described in Section II-B, the pre-cached signal x m is known perfectly at uc 1 . And the perfect channel state information (CSI) is fully available at cache-enabled users. Therefore, the (1−θ ) part of interference from b 1 and fully interference from b 2 can be cancelled [29] , [30] . The SINR of uc 1 is
For the ER of uc 1 , the received signal at an arbitrary ER e j ∈ e is given by
3 Note that x k include secure transmission and normal transmission from BSs in { b \b 0 }.
Thus the SINR of e j can be written as
Remark 1: We can observe from (8) 
B. BIT-LEVEL SCHEME
In this scenario, the BSs in Normal-transmission state use the same way to transmit signal as in the symbol-level scheme. The analysis of Normal-transmission in the bitlevel scheme is same as Section III-A-1. Therefore, we only discuss the secure transmission here.
A typical user with cache ability denoted as uc 2 requests f i from C. The nearest BS b 0 will serve this request within the bit-level scheme. The received signal at uc 2 is given by:
where x s represents the XOR result of x i with pre-cached signal x m and x j (j ∈ ( b 1 \b 0 ) represents the XOR result of x m with their respective target signal x j . For the typical user uc 2 , the pre-cached signal x m is perfectly known and the perfect CSI is assumed available. Therefore, uc 2 can recover the target signal x i by XOR the received signal with x m . But the interference from b 1 can not be cancelled as in Section III-A-2 without knowing x j . The SINR of uc 2 can be written as
For an arbitrary ER e j (j ∈ e ) of uc 2 , e j can not recover the target signal x i from received signal y e j c . Therefore the SINR of e j is shown as SINR e j c = 0.
IV. SECURITY METRICS ANALYSIS
In this section, the secrecy performance of two transmission protocols are compared in terms of average secrecy rate and secrecy coverage probability under two scenarios.
A. AVERAGE SECRECY RATE
Consider a link between the user u 0 and serving BS b 0 being intercepted by ERs ∈ e . We focus on the most detrimental ER which has the highest receiving SINR from b 0 . The instantaneous secrecy rate C is thus given as
where x † = max{x, 0}. C u and C e are, respectively, the instantaneous capacity of the user's (u 0 ) channel and the most detrimental ER's channel, which can be expressed uniformly as C i = log 2 (1 + γ i ), i = u, e. Here, γ e is the instantaneous received SINR of the most detrimental ER, which is given by
The average secrecy rate is defined as
and can be rewritten as [11]
where f γ u (f γ e ) and F γ u (F γ e ) are the probability density functions (PDFs) and cumulative probability functions (CDFs) of γ u and γ e , respectively. Therefore, the C of two transmission protocols under two scenarios are given as follow.
1) SYMBOL-LEVEL SCHEME
In this scenario, both users and ERs can receive target signal. To calculate C of two transmission protocols, we need to obtain the CDFs of γ u and (γ e ) at first.
a: Normal Transmission
In the normal transmission of the symbol-level scheme, the typical user without caching ability un 1 is intercepted by its most detrimental ER which is denoted as en 1 . The CDFs of SINRs at un 1 and en 1 is derived in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, respectively. Lemma 1: Let γ un 1 as the SINR of un 1 , the CDF of γ un 1 can be derived as
where Z(γ th ) =
is the Gauss hypergeometric function.
Proof: Please refer to Appendix A.
Lemma 2:
Let γ en as the SINR of the most detrimental ER of the typical user without caching ability. The CDF of γ en is given by
and [·] is the Gamma function. Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. By substituting the CDF of γ un in (15) and the CDF of γ en in (16) into (14), we can obtain the average secrecy rate of Normal-transmission in the symbol-level scheme. Since this average secrecy rate is not in a simple form, we present the interference-limited case in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: In the interference-limited scenario, i.e., σ 2 → 0, the average secrecy rate for the Normaltransmission is derived as
b: Secure transmission
In the secure transmission of the symbol-level scheme, the cache-enabled typical user uc 1 is intercepted by its most detrimental ER which is denoted as ec 1 . The CDFs of SINRs at uc 1 and ec 1 is derived in Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, respectively. Lemma 3: Let γ uc 1 be the SINR of the typical user with cache ability, the CDF of γ uc 1 can be calculated as
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. Lemma 4: Let γ ec be the SINR of the most detrimental ER of the typical cache-enabled user, the CDF of γ ec is written as
where
Proof: Please refer to Appendix D. By substituting the CDF of γ uc in (18) and the CDF of γ ec in (19) into (14), we can obtain the average secrecy rate of Secure-transmission in the symbol-level scheme. Since this average secrecy rate is not in a simple form, we present the interference-limited case in the following corollary.
Corollary 2: In the interference-limited scenario, the average secrecy rate for the symbol-level scheme in the Securetransmission is given by
2) BIT-LEVEL SCHEME
In this scenario, the average secrecy rate of Normaltransmission is same as the symbol-level scheme due to the same transmission scheme. Therefore, we only consider the case of Secure-transmission in this section.
In the secure transmission of the bit-level scheme, the cache-enabled typical user uc 2 can obtain target file while ERs can not. Therefore, we only need to derive the CDFs of SINRs at uc 2 in Lemma 5.
Lemma 5: Let γ uc 2 be the SINR of the typical user with cache ability, the CDF of γ uc 2 can be calculated as
Proof: Please refer to Appendix E. Since the ERs in e can not decode the target signal from the transmitted signal, their received signal SINR are forced to 0. By substituting the CDF of γ uc 2 in (22) into (14), we can obtain the average secrecy rate of Securetransmission which is shown in the following Lemma 6.
Lemma 6: The average secrecy rate for the bit-level scheme of Secure-transmission is given by
Proof: Please refer to Appendix F. As (23) is not in a closed form, we present the interferencelimited case to calculate C ST II of Scheme II. By setting β = 4, we can have the following proposition:
Proposition 1: When β = 4, the average secrecy rate for the secure transmission in the interference-limited scenario is
Proof:
In the interference-limited scenario, i.e., σ 2 → 0, we can omit the noise part in (23). When
, then the proposition is obtained.
Interestingly, we can observe the following results from Proposition 1
• The average secrecy rate C ST II increases with the cache hit probability δ which means enlarging the cache size M or cache the most frequently requested file p i can improve C ST II .
• The average secrecy rate C ST II decreases with the cache user ratio α which means more cache-enabled users lower C ST II . This can be explained as more cache-enabled users means more interference come from b 1 which can not be cancelled.
B. SECRECY COVERAGE PROBABILITY
Consider a link between the user u 0 and serving BS b 0 being intercepted by its most detrimental ER where their instantaneous secrecy rate is C defined as (13). Let R s be a given secrecy rate threshold. The delivery is securely successful when C is larger than the threshold R s . Thus, the secrecy coverage probability can be expressed as
1) SYMBOL-LEVEL SCHEME
In this scenario, both users and ERs can receive target signal. From (25) , the secrecy coverage probability can be derived as follow:
where f γ u (γ u ) and f γ e (γ e ) are the probability distribution functions (PDFs) of γ u and γ e , respectively.
a: Normal transmission
In the normal transmission, the typical user without caching ability un 1 is intercepted by its most detrimental ER which is denoted as en 1 . Note that f γ en 1 (γ e ) is hard to obtain from (16) . We present the interference-limited case in the following corollary.
Corollary 3:
In the interference-limited scenario, the secrecy coverage probability for the Normal-transmission is derived as
where G(γ th ) is given as
dx.
(28)
Proof: When σ 2 → 0, differentiate (16) to get f γ en 1 (γ e ). Then substituting f γ en 1 (γ e ) and (15) into (25), we can get this corollary.
b: Secure transmission
In the secure transmission, the cache-enabled typical user uc 1 is intercepted by its most detrimental ER which is denoted as ec 1 . Note that f γ ec 1 (γ e ) is hard to obtain from (19) . We present the interference-limited case in the following corollary.
Corollary 4: In the interference-limited scenario, the secrecy coverage probability of Secure-transmission is given by
Proof: When σ 2 → 0, differentiate (19) to get f γ ec 1 (γ e ). Then substituting f γ ec 1 (γ e ) and (18) into (25), we can get this corollary.
2) BIT-LEVEL SCHEME
In this scenario, the average secrecy rate of Normaltransmission is same as that of the symbol-level scheme. Therefore, we only consider the case of Secure-transmission in this section.
In the secure transmission, the cache-enabled typical user uc 2 can obtain target file while ERs can not. Therefore, the average secrecy rate of Secure-transmission is derived as follow:
Proposition 2: When β = 4, the secrete coverage probability for the secure transmission in the interference-limited scenario, is
Proof: (22) , then the proposition is obtained.
Interestingly, we can observe the following results from Proposition 2. • The secrete coverage probability P ST II increases with the cache hit probability δ which means enlarge the cache size M or cache the most frequently requested file p i can improve C ST II .
• The secrete coverage probability P ST II decreases with the cache user ratio α which means more cache-enabled users lower P ST II . This can be explained as more cacheenabled users means more interference come from b 1 which can not be cancelled.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are provided to evaluate the performance of the proposed transmission schemes. The BSs, Eves and users are distributed based on PPPs with density {λ b , λ e , λ u } = {1, 5, 100}/km 2 in the simulation. We consider the transmission power P = 30 dBm and the noise power σ 2 = −174 dBm. We consider the path loss exponent β = 4, the total number of files N = 100, the cache size M = 5, the power allocation ratio θ = 0.5, and the cache user ratio α = 0.5. In the simulation, the file popularity distribution is modeled as Zipf distribution [31] , i.e., the requested probability of the i-th ranked file is given by p i = 1/i η N j=1 1/j η where η ≥ 0 characterizes the skew of the popularity distribution. We use η = 0.8 in the simulation [32] . These parameters will not change unless specified otherwise.
In Fig. 2 , the average secrecy rate of the secure transmission C ST versus the power allocation ratio θ is illustrated. It can be seen that there exists an optimal θ * to achieve the maximal C ST for a given α, and different α has different θ * . As presented in (21), C ST cannot be expressed in a closed form. As such, we cannot derive θ * in theory. We can observe that the average secrecy rate C ST first increase with θ when θ ∈ (0, θ * ), then decreases with θ when θ ∈ (θ * , 1). This interesting phenomenon can be well explained from (6) and (8) . The increase of θ improves the SINRs of both user and Eve, but the increment at user is dominant in (0, θ * ). When θ is getting larger, the C ST will be compromised due to the growing effects of eavesdropping. We can also obtain that the secure transmission can achieve better optimal C in larger α scenario, because more secure transmissions occurs in the network. In Fig. 3 , the average secrecy rate C versus the density ratio of which is considered as a baseline. We can see that with the increase of λ e λ b , the C is decreased for both transmission schemes, which indicates that more Eves cause more serious eavesdropping. It should be highlighted that, even with λ e λ b = 10, the C ST is still above 1.5 bps/Hz which only reduced 25% from above 2 bps/Hz when λ e λ b = 0.1, while C NT reduces to 0.3 bps/Hz from 2 bps/Hz, i.e., reduced by 85%. In addition, we can also observe that the C ST improves with increasing cache size M , due to more interference signal can be cancelled with larger ratio of b 1 and b 2 .
In Fig. 4 , the secrecy coverage probability P for various
is presented. We can observe that P ST is much higher than P NT for both λ e λ b = 5 and 0.5, which indicates the promising effect of secure transmission in both Eve-dense scenario and Eve-sparse scenario. Similar as Fig. 3 , we can also see that more Eves cause more serious eavesdropping leading lower secrecy coverage probability. The simulation results are presented along with the theoretical ones in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 . We can see from the figures that the theoretical results are in excellent agreement with the simulation results.
In Fig. 5 , the average secrecy rate of secure transmission in two schemes under various cases are compared. The solid line represents C ST I while dotted lines represents C ST II . Note that the optimal power allocation ratio are choose in the symbollevel scheme to achieve maximal capacity by exhaustive search. We can observe that C ST II is much higher than C ST I even that the symbol-level scheme is in a Eve-sparse case i.e. λ e λ b = 0.5. We can obtain that although XOR the target file with cached file entails the cache-enabled user suffering more interference from b 1 , the outstand restrain to Eves of this scheme is more significant. Therefore the bit-level schem obtains greater average secrecy rate than the symbol-level scheme. We can also see that with large cache size M C ST II can be improved due to more cancelled interference from b 2 .
In Fig. 6 , the secrecy coverage probability of secure transmission in two schemes under various cases are compared. The solid line represents P ST I while dotted lines represents P ST II . Since we have compared the Eve-dense scenario and Eve-sparse scenario for the symbol-level scheme in Fig. 4 , we choose the Eve-sparse case as a baseline. We can observe the gap between P ST II and P ST I becomes small with the incasement of the threshold. By comparing the three cases of the bit-level scheme, we can also see that P ST II increases with the cache size M and decreases with lower cache user ratio α because of more cancelled interference from b 2 . VOLUME 6, 2018
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we reveal that the caching ability of users can be used to improve the PLS in the wireless cache-enabled HetNet. The two corresponding secure transmission schemes are developed. The first scheme combines the message signal with the pre-cached file to transmit. The artificial interference introduced by this scheme can resist Eve, while can be cancelled at the cache-enabled users. The second scheme can do the network coding for the message signal with the precached file in the bit level. In this scheme, Eves can decipher nothing without cached file. Based on the stochastic geometry, we derive the expression of average secrecy rate and secrecy coverage probability for the two schemes. Finally, we show that both secure transmission schemes achieve a significant security gain than the normal transmission. Moreover, the bit-level scheme is better than the symbol-level scheme especially in the Eve-dense case.
From (2), the CDF of γ un 1 is then derived as 
By substituting (33) into (32), we can obtain Lemma 1. (4) into (12), the CDF of γ en is
[SINR e i ≤ γ th ] = P r max
where step (a) follows from the PGFL of PPP, step (b) is obtained by converting coordinatesthe cartesian coordinates into polar coordinates, and S denotes γ th x β . According to Slivnyak-Mecke theorem, the interference comes from { b \b 0 } is equals to its original distribution. Therefore L I b (S) can be derived similarly as (37),
By substituting (35) into (34), the proof is then concluded. [28] . From (6), the CDF of γ uc 1 is then derived as is derived as 
By substituting (37), (38) 
where step (a) follows from the PGFL of PPP, step (b) is obtained by converting coordinatesthe cartesian coordinates into polar coordinates, and S denotes
. According to Slivnyak-Mecke theorem [33] , the interference comes from { b \b 0 } is the reduced Palm distribution of PPP b , which equals to its original distribution, i.e.
where step (a) follows from the PGFL of PPP, step (b) is obtained by converting cartesian coordinates into polar coordinates. By substituting (40) into (39), we can get F γ ec (γ th )as (20) . When γ ec > γ th 0 , it is clearly to note that F γ ec (γ th ) = 1. Then the proof is concluded.
E. PROOF OF LEMMA 5
From 10, the CDF of γ uc 2 is then derived as 
By substituting (42), (43) into (41), we can obtain Lemma 5.
F. PROOF OF LEMMA 6
From (13), we can get that: 
By substituting (22) into (45), we can obtain Lemma 6. 
